Taylor University

Pillars at Taylor University
Ayres Special Collection: Books

Books

1979

Perspectives: Limits and Possibilities: Two Essays on
Interpretation
Marjorie Cook
Miami University

Lewis Sego
Indiana State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pillars.taylor.edu/ayres-collection-books
Part of the Higher Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Cook, Marjorie and Sego, Lewis, "Perspectives: Limits and Possibilities: Two Essays on Interpretation"
(1979). Ayres Special Collection: Books. 10.
https://pillars.taylor.edu/ayres-collection-books/10

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Books at Pillars at Taylor University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Ayres Special Collection: Books by an authorized administrator of Pillars at Taylor
University. For more information, please contact pillars@taylor.edu.

PERSPECTIVES: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES
Two Essays on Interpretation

by
Marjorie Cook
Miami University
and
Lewis Sego
Indiana State University

res

CZ?,

cl

AYRES COLLECTION
TAYLOR UNIVERSITY

Gift of: Dr. Mildred Chapman

Published by Taylor University Press
Upland, Indiana 46989

$2

Cover art: "Perspective," a pen-and-ink drawing by Randy Smith, art instructor,
Mississinewa Junior High School
Gas City, Indiana
©1979 Taylor University
Upland, Indiana

'

PERSPECTIVES: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES
Two essays on Interpretation
"Frost's Modernism: A Marriage of Irony and Imagination"
by
Marjorie Cook, Ph.D.
Professor of English and
Assistant Dean
College of Arts and Sciences
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio
and
"Applications of Perspectivism to Literary Criticism"
by
Lewis Sego, Ph.D.
Professor of English
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, Indiana
Papers delivered on the occasion
of the retirement of
Hazel Carruth, Ph.D.
Chairman of the Department and
Professor of English, 1946-1978
Taylor University
Hodson Dining Commons

November 3, 1978

Edited by Robert A. Cotner

1979

Hazel Butz Carruth

A FOREWORD
Gene Wise has written, "Perspectives are the 'pictures in our heads' which
compress our experience into controllable form."1
The two essays in the monograph focus upon that highest form of expres
sion, literature, and create new perspectives, new "pictures in our heads" re
garding the poetry of Robert Frost and the general study of literary
criticism. Taken together these two essays constitute a broad statement on
perspectives in today's world, provide original insight into the ways of view
ing important matters in the world of ideas, and suggest basic elements in
herent in an understanding of both the modern world and its literature.
Marjorie Cook and Lewis Sego range widely in American literature and
literary criticism. Dr. Cook begins with a definition of Frost's modernism as
it arises from what she calls the "modern vision, ... a balance of irony and
imagination within a context of realism." She sees the present stance in this
"Age of Irony" derived from three principles of the human condition:
Change, Chance, and Finiteness. She pictures Frost moving beyond
philosophic irony to "the leap of faith and commitment made possible in
part by the imagination." She holds that "The imagination is the source of
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insight, of creative thinking, of synthesizing particulars into wholes, pat
terns." And she concludes, "Frost's playfulness includes this shrewdness
about playfulness: he sees the irony of the ironic stance; he knows that belief
is best. The awareness of potential irony, even total doubt in philosophic
irony, and the affirmation of the imagination are balanced in Frost's modern
vision."
Dr. Sego develops for what he calls this current age of "how," a new,
pluralistic philosophy called "perspectivism." Utilizing the visual image of a
tetrahedron composed of marbles, he develops this idea: "Essentially, the
philosophy of perspectivism says that the aspects of mankind's dual nature,
intellectual and emotional, should harmonize and reinforce each other." It is
this "internal consistency, a resolution of conflicts, and a harmonious
balance among the opposing forces and seemingly opposing points of view"
that is, in Dr. Sego's view, "The sole criterion for reality."
In his view, "the ultimate law will be the law of love, perhaps a love that
is so far beyond any that we have ever experienced as to amaze us." Thus the
philosophy has implications not 'only in literary criticism but in society as
well. "Ethically," he asserts, "perspectivism tests every act or decision by the
simple test of balance and harmony."
These two papers were read upon the occasion of the retirement from
Taylor University of Hazel Butz Carruth. They were given as a part of "A
Literary Symposium," November 2 and 3, 1978, sponsored by members of
the Department of English of the University. This symposium included ad
dresses and presentations by Daryl Adrian, Ball State University; Marjorie
Elder, Marion College; Roy Battenhouse, Indiana University; Arthur
Shumaker, DePauw University; George Clark, Hanover College; Phyllis
Scherle, IUPU1, and Janet Watson Sheeran, Rockhurst (Kansas) College, as
well as members of the Taylor University faculty and administration.
This monograph, Perspectives: Limits and Possibilities, is presented as a
tribute to Dr. Carruth by Taylor University, in loving gratitude for her
devotion to her students, the University, and our Lord, demonstrated in a
life of learning, scholarship, and teaching. She has, indeed, given guidance
to and enhanced the perspectives of thousands through her life of service.
'Gene Wise, American Historical Explanations (Homewood, 1L: The Dorsey Press, 1973), p. 36.

RAC

FROST'S MODERNISM: A MARRIAGE OF
IRONY AND IMAGINATION
MARJORIE COOK, Ph.D.

does happen: an unexpected and sharp
contrast.1
How did modern thinkers come to their
particular balance of irony and imagina
tion? To answer that, we must consider
the world they inherited. Three principles
of the human condition have always al
lowed for ironic reversals—change,
chance, and finiteness. The modern value
which produced a prevalence of philo
sophical irony was an overweaning de
sire for absolute rational certainty and,
by implication, for perfect rational or
der. All should be as rationally expected.
That desire ultimately led—over three
centuries—to the conclusion that ration
al certainty cannot exist in this world.
The subjective perspective which Des
cartes affirmed itself came to be doubted
as solipsism, a prison of subjectivity de
stroying all certainty. With that, gloom,
despair, negation—philosophical irony
—descended on the modern world.
The three characteristics of this world
which have always made possible ironic
reversals, to repeat, are change, chance,
and finiteness. First, the principle of
process or change itself limits a person's
certainty. People never have known the
future—nor even the meanings and sig
nificance of the present—nor of the past
completely, despite their having reflected
on it. Moreover, partly because the human

Eliot's poetry and criticism defined
modernism and determined taste for two
generations after he published The Waste
Land. Frost never did approve of that
definition for modernism nor standard for
taste and said so whenever he was asked—
and sometimes when not asked. One of my
colleagues always baits me by calling
Frost "a nice little nineteenth-century
nature poet." Somewhat in self-defense
both Frost and I have pondered modern
ism. In this paper I will be mainly con
cerned with the case for Frost's modern
ism in vision, though the case for his
modernism in form and technique is fas
cinating as well.
The essence of the modern vision, I con
clude, is a balance of irony and imagina
tion within a context of realism. It is in
their vision of balanced irony and imag
ination that Frost and Eliot are most alike.
Both are ironists, but not philosophical
ironists. Both move beyond philosophical
irony to the leap of faith and commitment
made possible in part by the imagination.
(Such belief is related to, but is not the
same as, religious belief.) Philosophical
irony is simply the principle of irony be
come a philosophy, a way of viewing all
of life. The principle of irony is the possi
bility of unexpected reversals, whether in
rhetoric or in life. Not all reversals are
ironic, but those which are sharp con
trasts to what is expected are ironic. The
sharper the contrast, the greater theirony.
In other words, not only does what is ex
pected not happen, but also its opposite

•For more complete discussion of irony seeD. C. Muecke,
The Compass of Irony (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1969)
and WayneBooth, The Rhetoricof Irony (Chicago: Univer
sity of Chicago Press, 1974).
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been inherent in the human condition?
Late nineteenth- and early twentiethcentury thinkers were not able to main
tain the harmony the great Romantics
had worked out for themselves between
the idealistic, imaginative, rational per
son and the dynamic, a-rational world.
In part, people had lost their sense of the
absolute, both in God and then in the
perfect or perfectible machinery of the
universe. Also, never before had so many
people demanded scientific and math
ematical proof for belief—and now de
manded it because they needed some
certainty. Under these circumstances, the
uncertainty inherent in the human con
dition becomes overwhelming because
people can see nothing worthy enough
and certain enough—for some that is the
same thing—on which to base their faith.
Idealizing the rational statement and
knowing it always to be a hypothesis, the
philosophical ironist doubts all rational
statement. He will make no commitments
because he cannot be sure that he is abso
lutely right, that the truth he thinks he
knows is really true or that the reality he
thinks he perceives is truly real. He cannot
see—nor leap—beyond this uncertainty,
having only his intellect to aid him. Thus
he is immobilized.
Modern thinkers who wished to move
beyond this immobilizing philosophical
irony had to explore the implications of
limited persons in a changing world in
relation to the counter values of the more
structured and static world of ideals. The
modern dilemma is actually a perennial
human problem, but one which becomes
a crisis, especially in such an Age of Irony.
How could one establish values, let alone
embody them in significant form? Frost
was among those "Poets of Reality"2 who
worked through to a positive philosophy,
to a commitment and faith again, beyond
philosophical irony. Frost and these others

being can choose among options, the
results of change cannot be guaranteed,
are not completely predictable. For in
stance, the Romantics—to oversimplify
for emphasis—had re-discovered that the
world is dynamic, and they had valued
organic growth, keeping a sense of the
absolute in the ideal. The Victorians,
having lost more of their sense of the ab
solute in the ideal, wished to improve the
view of a world-in-change with the cer
tainty of perfectibility; the Realists and
Naturalists, however, could not find
proof of any perfectibility in their neigh
bors' behavior—nor, confessed the great
ones, could they find it in their own be
havior. The Naturalists, in turn, saw a
certainty in the Second Law of Thermo
dynamics applied to history: everything
was spending itself to nothingness, disin
tegrating, degenerating. Rut to many
modern authors the certainty of nihilism
did not fit the facts of human experience
either—Frost among them, as this paper
will show.
Second, the principle of chance, even
more so than change, makes many, even
most, of the predictions about life at best
only probabilities—and many not even
that. If one longs for rational order and
perfection, the potential, unexpected
reversals in the world seem absurd. Third,
with the Realists and Naturalists, latenineteenth century thinkers emphasized
human limits—one's finiteness and long
ing for infiniteness, as well as one's spir
itual infiniteness confined in a finite
world. This emphasis on a person's desire
to know and his inability to know for
certain, his longing for immortality and
his inevitable death, point up the uncer
tainty, even absurdity, in the human
condition. It should be noted, however,
the human condition had not changed so
much as had values, beliefs, and em
phases.
How did these principles and values
produce a wave of philosophical irony if
contingency and ambiguity had always

2J. Hillis Miller in Poets of Reality (New York: Atheneum,
1974) details the confrontation and movement beyond
nihilism by six modern poets.
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(unfairly again revealing a bias for ratio
nalism) into an a-rational world. He can
create structures for meaning; he can
even "escape" with his commitments, as
in "I Could Give All to Time" (PRF, p.
334). Frost and many of his speakers enjoy
putting their skill, shrewdness, courage,
wisdom, and luck to the test in what he
likes to call a game "play[ed] for mortal
stakes" (PRF, p. 277). Even knowing the
inherent and inevitable potential for
tragedy, Frost values the right to fail and
the right to suffer as necessary possibilities
for one to attain meaning in the human
condition.
What we have in our human condition
is a world of appearances which must be
interpreted to have meaning. No inter
pretation is absolute; all interpretations
depend upon imagination, point of view,
and other subjective elements. While the
imagination is necessary, reason and even
a consciousness of philosophical irony are
also essential. Interpretation, after all,
involves both looking clearly at what is
and positing reasonable theory. (In this,
Frost is neither far from nor alienated
from the sciences.) Frost keeps both imag
ination and reason in a reasonableness.
Consider, for instance, "A Roundless
Moment":

did not have the ironist's rational bias;
Frost admitted that in matters philo
sophical "A melancholy dualism is the
only soundness," but then asked an un
expected question: "The question is: Is
soundness of the essence."3 That was the
key to moving beyond total doubt. Philo
sophical irony had reigned until poets and
others found in the imagination the be
ginning of a way out: a person's imagina
tion is essential to his humanity; a person
is more than a rational animal. Without
replacing religion by poetry, Frost and
others saw the imagination as basic to
one's making the leap of faith and commit
ment.
The imagination is the source of in
sight, of creative thinking, of synthesizing
particulars into wholes, patterns. It is that
which allows us to see beyond the narrow
rationalism of deductive logic into the
more expansive inductive logic which
requires a leap in generalization and hy
pothesizing. To see beyond the literal
present always demands imagination,
and nearly all thinking is metaphorical.
This play of imagination, this mental
agility, is essential in all insights, in seeing
new relationships. Through such an
alogical thinking people arrive at mean
ings and synthesize meaningsinto patterns
of values and philosophy.
Certainly human knowledge is limited,
but people must act. As Frost has Job say
in A Masque of Reason, We don't know
everything, but "we know well enough to
go ahead with/I mean we seem to know
enough to act on."4 We do venture into
the unknown, positing premises, acting
on probabilities. Frost's speaker usually
is not defeated or embittered, considering
himself a rational being thrown unfairly

He halted in the wind, and—what was that
Far in the maples, pale, but not a ghost?
He stood there bringing March against his thought,
And yet too ready to believe the most.
"Oh, that's the Paradise-in-Bloom," I said;
And truly it wasfair enough forflowers
Had we but in us to assume in March
Such white luxuriance of May for ours.
We stood a moment so, in a strange world,
Myself as one his own pretense deceives;
And then I said the truth (and we moved on).
A young beech clinging to its last year's leaves,

(p. 233-34)

In the poem the first interpretation of the
whiteness ahead is an illusion which does
not fit the facts. The first character is right
to "bring/March against his thought":
the outer and inner worlds must be in
harmony for a proper perspective on the

3Selected

Prose of Robert Frost, edited by Hyde Cox
and Edward Connery Lathem (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1966), p. 112. Future references to this work
will be in the text, designated SP.
*The Poetry of Robert Frost, edited by Edward Connery
Lathem (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969),
p. 483. Future reference to this work will be in the text,
designated PRF.

5

Not all situations are this clear. An ap
pearance may have different and even
opposing interpretations, and therein
begin the problems, as people have always
learned. The Puritans, along with their
other trials, had to face this one as well:
for instance, when lightning struck the
minister's house, they asked what it meant,
and their asking each other instead of the
minister was a turning point in New En
gland government. Was it a trial for the
just or a warning to the wicked? The an
swer depended in part on what you
thought of the minister—and what you
thought he thought of you—and you see
how quickly it becomesvery complicated.
Frost knows the value and richness of
ambiguity and would insist on it to keep
his freedom to interpret, his right to in
terpret. In the poem "On the Heart's
Beginning to Cloud the Mind," the poet
emphasizes that ambiguity is inherent in
appearances, here heightened by the
appearances being just the barest of frag
ments, and he also asserts the ambiguity
of the roles of reason and emotion—irony
and imagination, if you will—in interpre
tation.

world. Poirier, in an otherwise excellent
book, goes too far in calling this a poem
praising the imagination in its boundless
ness.3 He seems, in fact, to neglect the
ending. The positiveness associated with
imagination is overpowered at the end by
the strength of one word—truth—and the
power gained by that understatedness:
the abruptness, the matter-of-fact and
even casual tone at the end. In its under
statedness, that last statement becomes
the strongest, most positive assertion in
the poem. The speaker's earlier words for
accepting the illusions all have negative
connotations: "Myself as one his own
pretense deceives." Not all fictions are
useful; the imagination in its unboundedness can be destructive, deceiving.
In "A Boundless Moment," the pair,
having realized and accepted the truth (if
realized, it must be accepted), can move
on, which is better than staying "in a
strange world" with a false "luxuriance,"
an unrealistic dream. Moreso than
Poirier's comment, John Lynen's comment
on the poem keeps the balance between
the value of the imagination and the pref
erence of the actual over an unrealistic
dream. Even more important, Lynen sees
in the poet's acceptance of realistic
boundedness an assertion of a person's
spiritual being. (Perhaps that is the same
truth Poirier comes at aslant.)

Something I saw or thought I saw
In the desert at midnight in Utah,
Looking out of my lower berth
At moonlit sky and moonlit earth.
The sky had here and there a star;
The earth had a single light afar,
A flickering, human pathetic light,
That was maintained against the night,
It seemed to me, by the people there,
With a Godforsaken brute despair.
It would flutter and fall in half an hour
Like the last petal off a flower.
But my heart was beginning to cloud my mind.
I knew a tale of a better kind.
That far light flickers because of trees.
The people can burn it as long as they please;
And when their interests in it end.
They can leave it to someone else to tend.
Come back that way a summer hence,
I should find it no more no less intense.
I pass, but scarcely pass no doubt,
When one will say, "Let us put it out."
The other without demur agrees.

The fading of a vision may be sad, but the truth
fulness which will not take it too seriously has
something noble about it. The speaker's refusal
to accept anything but the truth, when the truth
is disappointing, demonstrates the courage of
man's intellect.
Unflinching honesty in the face of facts is a
recurrent theme in Frost's nature poetry. For it
is in this that he sees the basis of man's power
and indeed of his spiritual being. Man can never
find a home in nature, nor can he live outside of
it. But he can assert the reality of his spirit and
thus canexist independently of the physical world
in the act of looking squarely at the facts of
nature.6

8John F. Lynen, The Pastoral Art of Robert Frost (New
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 15152.

'Richard Poirier, Robert Frost: The Work of Knowing,
(NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 213-14.
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They can keep it burning as longas theyplease;
They can put it out whenever they please.
One looks out last from the darkened room
At theshiny desert with spots of gloom
That might be people and are but cedar,
Have no purpose, have no leader,
Have never made the first move to assemble,
And soare nothing to make her tremble.
She can think of places that are not thus
Without indulging a "Not for us!"
Life is not so sinister-grave.
Matter of fact has made them brave.
He is husband, she is wife.
She fears not him, they fear not life.
They know where anotherlight has been,
And more than one, to theirs akin,
But earlierout for bed tonight,
So lost on me in my surface flight.

knows, here and elsewhere, and interpret
for himself.
A more interesting ambiguity here is
that of the roles of reason and emotion,
irony and imagination, in interpreta
tion. The important thirteenth line and
title is quite obviously the crux of the po
em. But is it the head or the heart which
inclines toward a "Godforsaken brute
despair" in the darker interpretation ex
pressed in the first part of the poem in
contrast to the more encouraging inter
pretation detailed in the latter part? The
darker view may be seen as coldly factu
al and rational—reason in its narrow
sense leading to philosophical irony—or
the darker view may be seen as an undu
ly) fearful imagination in "a boundless
moment." The poem has been interpret
ed both ways. Emphasizing the ambigui
ty by repeating the line, the poet, I
think, means to show the terms are false
oppositions; one should interpret with
both heart and mind. Interpretation in
volves both looking clearly at what is
and positing a reasonable theory—uti
lizing with the best skill and insight, based
on understanding and courage, both the
rational and imaginative capacities.
Many fears are groundless, but not all
are. The worst possible tales may be true,
but here they do not square with the prob
abilities, the more reasonable view, based
on the greater understanding. Here the
more positive view, in contrast to that in
"A Boundless Moment," fits what facts
are known, and it also has the benefit of
being encouraging, heartening. Encour
aged, motivated to persist beyond what
narrow reason alone might dictate, a per
son can accomplish much that had not
seemed possible at first. The flickering
light does not necessarily signify the pa
thetic state of humans; the "spots of gloom"
are merely trees, after all. I wish to em
phasize, however, the encouraging inter
pretation the poet affirms here includes
much discipline and toughness. Futile
repeating, regretting, or dreaming is not

This I saw when waking late,
Going byat a railroad rate,
Looking through wreaths of engine smoke
Far into the lives of other folk. (p. 290-93)

The poet emphasizes that appearances
here are fragments, from which he draws
enough facts for two possible interpreta
tions. The opening statement is a sentence
fragment, and the narrative framework
shows that theincident is just a glimpse in
to the distance. Finally, the last four lines
are set off, emphasizing again the narra
tive framework and the incident-as-fragment. This ending seems to suggest that
the fragmentary nature of the incident
cannot lead to any final interpretation;
we simply don't have enough evidence,
and we've gained what was to be gained
through speculating. The tone here shifts
from the serious comic vision in the poem
to the merely humorous in these last four
lines, to mere word-play, although per
haps wreathe, related to writhe, main
tains the serious comic tone of the whole.
This throw-away ending, which is char
acteristic of Frost, usually gains ironic
force from understatement, as in "A
Boundless Moment," but here the throwaway conclusion seems to accomplish
simply that—to destroy the significance
built carefully by the rest of the poem.
The reader is returned to his own world
and left to build his own significances
from these appearances—and by implica
tion, from appearances in his own ex
perience. The reader must take what he
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A doe from round aspruce stood looking at them
Across the wall, as near the wall as they.
She saw them in their field, they her in hers.
The difficulty of seeing whatstood still,
Like some up-ended boulder split in two,
Was in her clouded eyes; they saw no fear there.
She seemed to think that, two thus, they were safe.
Then, as if they were something that, though
strange,
She could not trouble her mind with toolong,
She sighed and passed unscared along the wall.
"This, then isall. What more is thereto ask?"
But no, not yet. A snort to bid them wait.
A buck from round the spruce stood looking at
them
Across the wall, as near the wall as they.
This was an antlered buck of lusty nostril,
Not the same doe come back intoher place.
He viewed them quizzically with jerks of head,
As if to ask, "Why don't you makesome motion?
Or givesome sign of life? Because you can't.
I doubt if you're as living as you look."
Thus till he had them almost feeling dared
To stretch a proffering hand—and a spell-break
ing.
Then he too passed unscared along the wall.
Two had seen two, whichever side you spoke from.
"This must be all." It was all. Still they stood,
A great wave from itgoingoverthem,
As if the earth in one unlooked-for favor
Had made them certain earth returned their love.
(pp. 229-230)

"indulged." Most significantly, the nar
rator comments, "Matter of fact has made
them brave."
What Frost objects to is what he sees as
the abuse of either reason or imagination—
when either alone is offered as sufficient
in itself for life. Imagination by itself may
dwell unrealistically in "boundless mo
ments." Intellect alone leads to irony, and
Frost sees the irony of philosophical irony.
But Frost will not easily dismiss reason; he
has too much respect both for Yankee
common sense and shrewdness and for the
Greek Golden Mean. But intellect by it
self, though it may produce great ration
al systems, may also be unrealistic. It
cannot predict the future with certainty
nor give absolute answers to the great
questions of human meaning. Frost is
neither anti-science nor anti-philosophy,
though he will remind us of the limits of
both. More exactly, he is anti-systems; he
sees too much systematizing both in sci
ence and philosophy as an abuse and ex
aggeration of reason, as assumption and
a presumption that rational structure
should be supreme. In any system, as any
careful student knows, much variance
will remain unexplained, and Frost in
sists that that variance be acknowledged
somehow.
The ideal attitude in life seems a con
scious and dynamic balance of reason and
imagination, infused throughout with an
awareness of potential irony. "Two Look
at Two" shows a couple capable of both
sense and sensibility, irony and imagina
tion.

The situation has a perfection about it;
the first and last words in the poem are
love. The couple have a great sympathy
with nature; the animals are—or seem to
be—unaware of alien presences. The
couple even have sufficient sympathy and
imaginative relationship with nature to
be playful, to engage in the fantasy of say
ing "Good night to woods." Significantly,
such an "unlooked-for favor" as they
receive can come only to those who already
believe. Although playful, the couple are
not especially naive: they are sufficiently
rational not to court disaster, showing at
least a latent awareness of potential irony
in nature as antagonist. Their sigh reveals
reluctant but realistic resignation to neces
sity. Accepting reality, they are then sur
prised by the unexpected, additional
events which seem special favors.
The meaning of the events is posited
from interpretation, as are all meanings,
and the meaning here is believable because
in this instance the "design" seems com-

Love and forgetting might have carried them
A little further up the mountainside
With night so near, but not much further up.
They must have haltedsoon in any case
With thoughts of the path back, how rough it was
With rock and washout, and unsafe in darkness;
When they were halted by a tumbled wall
With barbed-wire binding. Theystood facing this,
Spending what onward impulse they still had
In one last look the way they must not go,
On up the failingpath, where, if a stone
Or earthslide moved at night, it moved itself;
No footstep moved it. "This is all,"they sighed,
Good-night to woods." But not so; there was more.
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pelling. The narrator plays the game of
"as-if," seemingly with them, in inter
preting the meaning of the deer's actions
and the great wave of feeling which follow.
The closing scene seems an epiphany:

ment" is not, as I have indicated, appli
cable to that poem so much as it is to this
one:

Two had seen two, whichever side you spoke from.
"This must be all." It was all. Still they stood,
A great wave from it going over them.
As if the earth in one unlooked-for favor
Had made them certain earth returned their love.
(p. 230)

All interpretations are "as-if" construc
tions and are related to fantasy and faith:
one acknowledges the reality of the outer
world and one's inability to penetrate it
completely. This game of interpretation,
"as-if," is serious play, the only modus
vivendi possible to humans—play because
one must interpret to determine meanings,
and serious because one's "salvation" de
pends upon the patterns he discerns and
the values he establishes. By consciously
acknowledging his "as-if s," he maintains
his saving grace: he knows he might be
wrong—the ironic consciousness. The
interpretation is an "as-if' construction,
but it is not necessarily not real. It is real
for them, and neither the narrator nor the
poet seems critical of their response. Some
readers think that, with each pair remain
ing on its own side of the wall, communion
does not occur, and the epiphany is thus
not warranted. Communion of the
Romantic kind, however, is not claimed;
the poet is claiming something unusual
has occurred—at least for the couple—in
"two had seen two, whichever side you
spoke from." The couple here are capable
of a trust in the "as-if," and thus they—or
perhaps only the narrator—come to real
ize that "happiness makes up in height for
what it lacks in length" (PRF, p. 333).
Humans do not experience a constant
sense of metaphysical transcendence, but
the imagination which produces these
epiphanies and the poetry which perpe
trates them do sustain the human being.
Poirier's comment on "A Boundless Mo

Frost is a poet who sets out to prove that nature
itself wants us to"pretend" while knowing we are
doing so, that it wants us to believe in something
without certifying what it should be, and that, in
its capacities for self-preservation, it offers a
model for how we might preserve our mythologies
in poetry. It is a process, to use Frost's own good
way of describing it in "A Boundless Moment,"
of letting one's "own pretense" deceive. . . .
This is a poem about "pretending" whenever
nature gives you any sort of license, apocalyptic
or redemptive, for doing so. And it is out of such
moments of illusion or extremity that images
emerge which belong to and are perpetuated by
poetry.7

Frost would agree with Wordsworth that
a person half perceives, half creates his
world. With the "as-if" Frost is calling
attention to what he sees as the essence of
poetry and its significance to the human
being. Frost goes so far as to say, "Give us
immedicable woes—woes that nothing
can be done for—woes flat and final. And
then to play. The play's the thing. Play's
the thing. All virtue is 'as-if'" (SP, p. 67).
Poetry is made from these immedicable
woes in the human condition, and the
poetry (or any accommodation of them) is
made by the play, the play of mind and
imagination in interpretating, in positing
useful "as-if" constructions which may
even give us bases for action, and, further
more, some of our action is believing those
"as-if" constructions into being. Play in
volves detachment, which can mean per
spective, even sanity. One can master the
immedicable woes through the serious
play of "as-if," through imagination ma
nipulating the details into a pattern, con
trolling the outer forces that can be de
structive, by fitting them into a formal
structure. They are not then completely
uncontrolled, chaotic, and destructive;
one has a perspective on them. Life is
"played seriously" in this way. This con
trol by play, by imagination, is the main
7Poirier,
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pp. 213-14.

of detachment—may exist—and should
exist—but without nullifying belief. One
may live in relativity with a firm center of
conviction: one may believe with "a most
knowing eye" (Poe, "Romance"). Frost
understands belief in what he knows are
necessarily and necessary "as-if" con
structions, imaginative constructions.
A final point: for Frost, form itself en
hances faith. Creating structures involves
belief, even depends upon one's believing.
Whereas the philosophical ironist may
emphasize form as perhaps a person's only
certainty and only value worthy in itself,
Frost counters, "I think [form] must
stroke faith the right way" (SP, p. 106).
To him the creation of form is itself a
commitment beyond irony, a
"believ[ing] the poem into existence"
(SP, p. 45). Writing a poem demands a
faith beyond the narrow intellect. In
that commitment itself, we find his
justification for a commitment not only
to structure, which the philosophical
ironist may accept, but also to belief.
"Making little poems encourages a man to
see that there is a shapeliness in the
world."9 He elaborates this point in some
detail in "Education by Poetry":

effect that Donald Greiner sees in Frost's
use of irony.8
WhileFrost, like Wordsworth, believes
a person half perceives, half creates his
world, he, like Wordsworth, also em
phasizes that one should be carefully at
tentive to the realities, hard facts, of that
outer world. One's relationship with that
outer world can incorporate trust—but
one also knows what he is doing, marrying
irony with that glorious imagination—
faith and commitment beyond irony and
in the face of irony—a perspective which
allows him to be tough-minded, realistic,
and still capable of faith. Frost takes a
hard look at what he sees, and he can be
objective enough to see much value on
both sides—reason and imagination,
common sense and those"passionate pref
erences" (PRF, p. 467). The opposing
truths complement each other. One must
balance his"passionate preferences" with
his intellectual preferences. Reasonably
and pragmatically, people simply devise
the best working balance they can live by
it, as in metaphor, until it breaks down
and needs revision.
Because Frost knows each side has limits
and is valid only in relation to the other
side, to its counter-truth, he can play
with the limits, can engage in whimsy and
fantasy, knowing their value and truth in
relation to hard facts. He is notsaying that
whimsy is hard fact, but why should one
eliminate the fun and the particular effect
of whimsy? Whimsy is "wrong," as any
view is "wrong," only when it is pretend
ing to be its opposite—for instance,
whimsy parading as realism—or asserting
that its opposite has no value, that it it
self is absolute in value and validity.
While one should not believe in judg
ments as absolutes, neither should one
refuse to make them. One sees both the
difficulty of constructing an order that
can be believed in—and the necessity for
doing so. Irony, humor, play—all forms

The person who gets close enough to poetry, he is
going to know more about the word belief than
anybody else knows, even in religion nowadays.
There are two or three places where we know
belief outside of religion. One of them is at the age
of fifteen to twenty, in our self-belief. ... In his
foreknowledge he has something that is going to
believe itself into fulfilment, into acceptance.
There is another belief like that, the belief in
someone else, a relationship of two that isgoing to
be believed into fulfillment. . . . That belief can
fail, of course.
Then there is a literary belief. Every time a
poem is written, every time a short story is written,
it is written not by cunning, but by belief. The
beauty, the something, the little charm of the
thing to be, is more felt than known. . . . No one
who has ever come close to the arts has failed to
see the difference between things written (me
chanically), with cunning and device, and the
kind that are believed into existence, that begin in
something morefelt than known.. ..
"Quoted by John Ciardi in "Robert Frost: Master Con
versationalist," Saturdati Review of Literature, 42 (March
21,1959), 20.

"Donald Greiner, "The Use of Irony in Robert Frost,"
South Atlantic Bulletin, 38 (May 1973), 52-60.
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Now I think—I happen to think—that those
three beliefs that I speak of, the self-belief, the
love-belief, and the art-belief, are all closely
related to the God-belief . . . the relationship
we enter into with God to believe the future in—
to believe the hereafter in. (SP, pp. 44-46)

Such believing the future into being is the
most creative act in our lives. Moreover,
he wrote to Untermeyer, "Belief is better
than anything else, and it is best when
rapt, above paying its respects to any
body's doubt whatsoever. At bottom the
world isn't a joke."10 Frost's playfulness
includes this shrewdness about playful
ness; he sees the irony of the ironic stance;
he knows that belief is best. The aware
ness of potential irony, even total doubt
in philosophical irony, and the affirma
tion of the imagination are balanced in
Frost's modern vision.

10Selected Letters oj Robert Frost, edited by Lawrence
Thompson (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965),
p. 300.
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APPLICATIONS OF PERSPECTIVISM
TO LITERARY CRITICISM
LEWIS P. SEGO, Ph.D.

When I decided on the title, "Applica
tions of Perspectivism to Literary Criti
cism," I had anticipated that the ad
vance article on perspectivism would
already be in print by the time this ad
dress came around. However, as many of
you know, the first time an article is sent
out it does not always lodge. The ad
vance article bounced back and had to
be sent out again. It is therefore not in
print yet. Before I can deal with literary
criticism to any advantage from the
perspective of perspectivism, I must talk
about the background of the theory and
the philosophy itself.
Samuel Taylor Coleridge once pub
lished in the Morning Post a quatrain
which said of "The Rhyme of the An
cient Mariner" what might well be said
of perspectivism:

the other predisposes some individuals to
see the forest and miss the trees, while
others see the trees but never the forest.
This differentiation remains indepen
dent of intelligence but sets the stage for
other cognitive processes.
How did someone in English, I am fre
quently asked, become interested in the
relationships between cognitive pro
cesses and language and literature? I
must say that it was a rather freaky acci
dent that I ran across a student at Bob
Jones University several years ago whose
background was quite different from
mine and whose innate predispositions
seemed to have been almost diametri
cally opposed to mine. Hence, we were
attracted. After leaving Bob Jones Uni
versity in order to wed this young lady, I
found that every problem we tackled
somehow turned inside out for one of us.
If the problem were to determine how
many groceries we were going to be able
to afford for the remainder of the month,
my wife would very likely subtract and I
would very likely add. We approached
almost everything diametrically op
positely. It became necessary for us to
ask questions to cope with this seeming
divergency of mind. In those early days I
began to suspect that there was some
thing in the organization of intellect,
something dating back much earlier in
our lives, that was influencing our

Your poem must eternal be,
Dear Sir. It cannot fail.
For 'tis incomprehensible
And without head or tail.

Perspectivism is a philosophy growing
out of a theory of the organization of in
tellect. "My mind to me a kingdom is,"
wrote Sir Edward Dyer in 1588. Nor did
he know the truth he spoke. A recent
book, The Mystery of the Mind,1 by
Canadian surgeon, Dr. Wilder Penfield,
presents results of studies of mental func
tioning during his long career in brain
surgery on over 3,000 patients. His
recently published findings lend support
to the view that dominance of one
hemisphere of the cerebral cortex over

1 Wilder Penfield, The Mystery of the Mind: A
Critical Study of Consciousness and the Human
Brain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
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it seemed to indicate that there was a
tendency, somewhat stable, toward
dominance of one hemisphere of the
cerebral cortex over the other. This later
led to a reconsideration of philosophy. I
went back and reread Locke, Berkeley,
Hume, and parts of Kant. I looked again
at Hegel, reread T. S. Eliot. I decided
that Socrates had seen both forest and
trees from afar, that Plato had gotten the
message and had seen the forest a little
bit more closely. Aristotle, rejecting the
basic premise of Plato, took interest in
the trees and saw them in greater detail.
Then Jesus came along and synthesized
the whole thing. From these considera
tions I had to reconstruct my own
philosophy. When I finished, I had what
I termed a pluralistic philosophy called
"perspectivism."
Now, if you will allow me to implant
in your imagination for a moment a
model that we could use as a visual aid, I
should like to construct in your mind's
eye a tetrahedron, or a four-sided
pyramid including the base as one side,
built, in other words, of equilateral
triangles along the sides. Furthermore, I
should like to construct it of marbles, just
ordinary agates. I should like to glue
them together with superglue, starting at
the base and trying to hold them in place
in a triangular shape until I could fit
others in the center and stick them all
together.
But, you can already see the problem
of trying to form a triangle first. It is
much easier, especially with superglue,
to stick two or three marbles together in
the center and build the triangle around
them. It is easier yet to take one marble
and stick it to three already stuck
together lying on the table and create a

perception.
Robert and Elizabeth Barrett Brown
ing had experienced something of a
similar attraction of opposites. Robert's
poetry was almost entirely antithetical in
form, in function, and in essence to that
of Elizabeth. And yet they were the im
mortal lovers.2 It seemed that there was
a compatibility between opposites that
needed further study. When the time
came for submitting a proposal for my
doctoral dissertation, the first thing that
occurred to me was a study of the
Brownings, since I was interested in Vic
torian literature, as well as cognitive
functions.
Thus, I combined the two studies and
conducted an empirical investigation of
cognitive styles among students studying
the Browning poetry. The result was a
startling discovery to me because I
thought perhaps I was seeing rare in
stances of the phenomenon, not a pat
tern that would permeate society. Ap
proximately fifty percent of the students
randomly selected from all of the
freshman English classes at Indiana State
University turned out to be "field depen
dent."3 Now, this term is one widely
used in cognitive study but not so widely
used in our discipline. "Field
dependent," to cast it in other terms, is
basically a sort of Gestalt dependency, a
dependency on patterns to recognize
details, a tendency to see the forest first
and then the trees. About fifty percent of
the students—and this was quite apart
from their intellects, quite apart from
their intelligence quotients—kept seeing
the trees and missing the forest at first
and had to work to put the trees together
to see the forest. They were the "field in
dependent" people.
In order to study them further I
developed an inductive presentation of
some of Robert Browning's works and a
deductive presentation of the same
works and presented those to both types
of students in a random pattern. There
was an actual crossing of abilities, so that

2 Frances
Winwar, The Immortal Lovers:
Elizabeth Barrett and Robert Browning, a Biogra
phy (New York: Harper, 1950).
3 Lewis Sego, "The Interactive Effect of Induc
tive and Deductive Sequences and Cognitive Styles
on the Acquisition of a Higher Order Concept in
English Literature" (Diss. Indiana University
1974).
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tiny pyramid, and then lift it up, placing
some others there and pushing them
together until that other pyramid can
stick to those, and so build the pyramid
from the top rather than from the bot
tom. Now, if you visualize this tetra
hedron of marbles as composed of four
equilateral triangles of glass spheres, you
can see readily that tipping it over makes
no difference in its appearance. We can
continue to tip it from one side to the
next. And, each time we tip it, there is a
point at the top where one marble rests
above all others.
With this visual aid in mind, I should
like you silently to respond to the ques
tion, "What is this that I imaginatively
hold in my hand?" The responses that
normally come from vocal members of
an audience range all the way from "a
pyramid" to "a paperweight." If you
said a pyramid, you were thinking about
the form. If you said a tetrahedron, you
were being more specific about the form.
If you said a tetrahedron of marbles, you
were thinking about the essence and the
form. If you said a tetrahedron of glass
marbles, you were being even more
specific about the essence. And if you
said it was a paperweight, you were
speaking functionally. If you said it was
a model presented to our imaginations,
you were speaking functionally. And if
you said it was a model made of marbles,
you were dealing with both function and
essence.
This insight began to glow as a new
concept in my mind in relation to these
other studies. I began to see as it rested
on its base, each of the three upright
facets, a different perspective on which
we view reality and literature. I began to
realize that out in the real world, outside
the ivied walls, most people would have
reacted to the form first. In fact, it
would have been almost as if we had
turned this tetrahedron so that the bot
tom side, of course, would not be visible,
and the other two sides would be behind
with only one facet, the facet of form,

appearing to the general populace.
However, some technically trained
people in a new age—in an age of "how"
—have turned slightly this pyramid so
that they can see a bit of the side we call
function. They see a great deal of the
form side; they see a little bit of the func
tional side. But, when they see two sides
from the front, they cannot see the side
that is behind. They cannot see the
essence unless they take a new perspec
tive. As long as they go around the base
of such a pyramid, they will see only one
side at a time; but, if they ever reach the
top, they can see three sides at once; they
can see form, function, and essence
simultaneously.
I began to think about this analogy in
relation to exercising critical scholarship.
If Plato's black horse and white horse in
the Phaedras had been made a team in
stead of antagonists, their cooperative
efforts might have resulted in a new
discovery for Plato and new strength for
mankind. And, if one of the horses had
been male and the other female, not only
would they have been a powerful team,
they would have spawned new genera
tions of powerful teams. Out of such a
hypothesis has emerged this new plural
istic philosophy called perspectivism. It
seeks to establish its solidarity, not on a
single way of perceiving reality, but on
multiple but harmonious ways of per
ception of what is real. Perspectivism,
like a tetrahedron, can assume a new
base and a new vortex each time it is
tipped. The sole criterion for reality,
therefore, becomes internal consistency,
a resolution of conflicts, and a har
monious balance between opposing for
ces and seemingly opposing points of
view. Its merit lies in its potential for
bringing harmony among the perspec
tives that until now seemed to be an
tagonists, that until now had not been
teamed up. A potential new strength for
mankind could conceivably result.
Essentially, the philosophy of perspec
tivism says that the aspects of mankind's
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rein on his emotions, he might not have
been able to remain in the kingdom of
the sane as long as he did. The dual
nature seems to function best when
neither side dominates and when the two
are not regarded enemies but allies of
equal rank.
Functionally, the philosophy of perspectivism says that a consistent ontology
must consist in love, that a consistent
ethic must consist in harmony, that a
consistent aesthetic must consist in
balance, and that a consistent epistemology must consist in raw experience.
Berkeley would say, "sense data." How
ever, the unique strength of the philoso
phy lies, once again, in its flexibility, not
its rigid philosophical system. I think
Frost would like that. Its ontology can
also consist in raw experience when its
epistemology consists in love. We tip the
tetrahedron. You may have to take that
down in your notes and think about that
a bit. We have, in allegorical fashion,
equated the base of this tetrahedron with
the individual experiences, myriads of
individual experiences, over all of the
sensory channels that have been feeding
into our cognitive kingdoms for our en
tire lives. Those are the raw experiences
from which another kind of ontology
could develop.
In other words, the ontology can start
at the top, or the ontology can start at
the bottom. Within the Christian per
spective the epistemology can begin in
God's love, you see, the beginning of
wisdom. Or, it can begin in raw ex
perience. It can begin in the law, which
for the Apostle Paul became his school
master to lead him to experiences with
Christ. In other words, if we hold that
love is the summum bonum, the philoso
phy will function for us as long as the
method of analysis is applied in our quest
for knowledge, that is, as long as we pro
ceed from love, wherever that is viewed
on the tetrahedron, to analyze it into its
components, proceeding analytically un
til we have ultimately reached the level

dual nature, intellectual and emotional,
should harmonize and reinforce each
other, much in the way male and female
harmonize and reinforce each other. So
convinced of this premise was Nathanial
Hawthorne that he said on one account
that he suspected the unpardonable sin
was the separation of the head from the
heart. And now in the midst of scientific
discoveries about the two hemispheres of
the cerebral cortex and about their dif
ferent functioning, one being a logical
cortex and the other storing exactly the
same material that is stored in the other
half but storing it in an entirely different
way—in not so logical a way, but in an
intuitive way—we begin to develop a
hunch that what Plato described as two
horses was a phenomenon he had sensed
in his own intellectual development as he
shifted the emphasis from one hemi
sphere to the other.
The intellect, in its analytical plunge
from some ideal of truth and beauty
toward the foundations of human ex
perience, keeping in mind the tetra
hedron, of course, needs the guiding of
emotion to bear it up when its feet
become stone-bruised. John Stuart Mill,
for example, found that when he spent
his energies for long periods of time in
analytical thinking, starting with the top
marble and going down, breaking things
into finer and finer parts, he became
despondent, depressed, for no apparent
reason. Upon chancing to find Cole
ridge's poem, "Dejection: an Ode" Mill
records in his Autobiography that his
spirit was renewed and his dejection
lifted at finding sympathetic companion
ship in the poem. Thereafter, he re
freshed his emotions periodically by
turning to literature and the arts where
he could bring back into balance the
emotions and the intellect. Similarly,
Ezra Pound found such elation in his
synthesizing of experience and his soar
ing to philosophical heights beyond
everyday, conventional reality that, had
it not been for his intellect to keep a tight
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bring the child out. So, interestingly, it
began to occur that perhaps love and
hate were not the antagonists or the opposites, but love and fear. Love tends to
draw people together; fear tends to draw
them apart.
If we hold that raw experience is the
summum bonum, the philosophy will
function for us as long as we apply the
method of synthesis in our quest for
knowledge, that is, as long as we proceed
from the base of firsthand experience to
synthesize the experiences into hypothe
ses, test those hypotheses, synthesize
those that will fit together into theories,
test those theories, synthesize those
theories that will fit together into laws,
test those laws, and synthesize those laws
into truths. With that synthetic process
at work in the scientific community, we
have a logical direction in which to pro
ceed. For, from those laws, presumably,
ultimately will emerge the truth. It will
not be the kind of truth that Sherwood
Anderson talks about in "The Gro
tesques," the kind of truth that each one
latches onto and goes off into his own
corner to contemplate, thus distorting
his reality.
To illustrate, let us enlarge our
tetrahedron in our minds' eyes now—
and I much prefer imaginary models to
physical models because in the imagina
tion we can perform the miracle of
enlarging a marble tetrahedron into one
large enough to postulate some in
teresting relationships on it. If we, in go
ing toward the top, stop short of the real
truth, the ultimate truth, and think we
have it, we become what Anderson calls
"grotesques."
It is grotesque to stop short of the
ultimate truth in our quest, to think that
because we have arrived at some notion
that fits everything that is below it, we
have reached the top. If we let one mar
ble along the side represent the top of a
smaller tetrahedron and all the addi
tional marbles we peal away, if that
were possible, we might be deluded into

of specific experience.
The relationship between love and
fear and mental processes holds impor
tance for our study. Recent brain
research seems to indicate that fear in
hibits the free flow of electrical energy
across the corpus callosum, a network of
nerves connecting the two hemispheres
of the brain. When fear comes in, the in
hibition of those nerve impulses causes
the brain to shunt down to a lower level
of operation. Now researchers have
tested this with electronic probes in open
brain surgery and found this to be the
case. Recently in Great Britain an inven
tor developed a device to put on the
throat of a stutterer that would generate
unpredictable tones into headphones to
block out the sound of the speaker's own
voice, with instantaneous curing of stut
tering. Had I not heard this on the BBC
in a live demonstration, I would have
doubted it. A stutterer was placed on the
air and asked to read, and he read, stut
tering almost every word in the lines.
The experimenters turned the page,
placed on his throat the device I have
described, put the headphones on his
ears, and had him read another passage.
He read it without stuttering, without
faltering a moment, because every time
he uttered a syllable, the vibration of his
voice generated an electronic sound
totally different from his own and
blocked out the inner transmission of the
sound of his voice. The experimenters
concluded that it was fear, fear of the
reader's own voice, that was producing
his stuttering.
The studies are continuing and in
dicate even further that fear seems to in
hibit mental processes. Interestingly
enough, however, love of the agape type
—even of the filia type but especially of
the agape type—facilitates mental func
tioning. A mother or a father in times of
tremendous stress, when they would nor
mally be afraid, have been able because
of love for a child, selfless love for a
child, to plunge into a burning room and
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universe—in a random pattern unless in
some way directed—and that photons
may be the means by which matter and,
he says, "if there is spirit," spirit may
communicate.4 There is one problem
with photons, philosophically and physi
cally: unless they are traveling at
precisely 186,000 miles per second, we
cannot detect them. If they are going
faster, they cease to be detectable and,
therefore, for all we know, cease to exist.
If they go more slowly they are
nondetectable and, therefore, for prac
tical purposes, cease to exist. He is
speculating that the photon may be the
next item of study in physics along with
the neutrino, the particle that is smaller
than the neutron, electron, and proton.
If the energy that we know love can
produce releases photons from the brain,
it may account for the facilitation that I
was describing along the corpus callosum connecting the two cerebral
hemispheres. It may even give scientific
credence to what Nathaniel Hawthorne
had to say about the unpardonable sin,
that we dehumanize ourselves and put
ourselves off from divine love when we
separate the heart from the head. Such
harmony and balance in perspectivism
is, I think, an important aspect of the
philosophy, by which we can test good
literature from bad literature.
The synthesist, unlike the analyst,
cannot properly proceed from the as
sumption of faith in some preconceived
notion of truth, beauty, or deity. To pro
ceed synthetically from the top marble,
to proceed synthetically from such an
assumption, risks moving into existen
tialism and ultimately into nihilism. In
other words, if we start synthesizing
when we are standing on the top marble,
we are in nihilism. We can synthesize as
long as we are down on the ground of
raw experience. We can analyze when
we are at the top. If, however, the syn-

thinking that we had them all—that we
had all our marbles. We would still have
a tetrahedron, only this time a smaller
one. Perhaps our cognitive realities are
too small. Perhaps our literary criticism
partakes of this smallness, this grotesqueness.
The philosophy assumes that the
ultimate law will be the law of love,
perhaps a love that is so far beyond any
that we have ever experienced as to
amaze us. Thus, a harmonious whole
will pervade the system to provide
stability and direction to the further in
terpretation of experience. More specifi
cally, the analyst cannot properly pro
ceed from a close scrutiny of a single ex
perience without risking a hasty general
ization. If, however, the analyst wishes
to proceed in building his philosophy
from a starting point of faith, he must
begin with the assumption that there is
some ultimate reality, some supreme
truth, some universal beauty, perhaps a
god or deity of some kind, I submit.
From such a starting point, the analyst
need only test subsequent parts of his
system by the test of harmony. If the new
parts harmonize with the previous struc
ture, the new parts have validity and can
be safely incorporated into the philo
sophical system.
The ancient Greeks began with the
concept of love analyzed into three subconcepts: eros, the physical, animal form
of love; philia, the mental or brotherly
form of love; and agape, the spiritual or
selfless form of love, perhaps the full
measure of which we have not yet at
tained. This emotion seems to harmonize
both intellect and emotion and to pro
duce not only internal harmony, har
mony within the individual human be
ing, but harmony between individuals
and between groups of individuals, no
matter what other differences may exist.
A NASA physicist has just recently
published a book in which he postulates
the theory that photons are being given
off and received by every atom in the

4 Adrian Clark, Psycho-kinesis: Moving Matter
with the Mind (West Nyack, N.Y.: Parker
Publishing Company, 1973), p. 112.

18

thesist wishes to build a harmonious
coherent system, he must begin with per
sonal experience, carefully observed and
paired with similar personal experiences
to construct a hypothesis. The hypothesis
must be tested because individual ex
perience is subject to individual inter
pretation. About fifty percent of what
we see occurs in the mind. A blind man
was running along a campus sidewalk a
few days ago, his cane snapping back
and forth in rapid succession from the
walls of the buildings to the concrete
pavement. Though sightless, he was run
ning with confidence. He had developed
such a keen sense of hearing that he was
reconstructing in his mind's eye the pic
ture of that entire pavement far enough
in advance to make rapid steps without
stumbling. Everything he saw occurred
in his mind. To avoid the distortion of
subjective vision, we must test our
hypotheses and join them with other
tested hypotheses that can be used to
form a theory. The theory must be har
monized or synthesized with other
theories to form laws; and this, fellow
students of literature, I believe, is where
we need to begin in forming some sound
direction in studying language and
literature. We need to start with these
fundamentals and start forming hypoth
eses about these fundamentals, testing
them and comparing them with similar
ones to create theories and then test those
theories to find similarities among theo
ries to create laws of language and
literature. Then we may be able to get
somewhere. This is the way the hard
scientists have gone about selling their
subjectivity. Once the laws have been
synthesized or harmonized, a supreme
law should emerge, maybe not in our
lifetime. This law should be one's summum bonum, one's truth, one's beauty,
or if you will, one's deity.
We have looked at perspective essen
tially; we have looked at it functionally;
now we shall look at it formally. Formal
ly, the philosophy of perspectivism says

that both the idealist and the realist are
right, each being right for whoever
thinks he is right. Yet, the restriction
placed on each becomes one of in
vestigatory method. The idealist must
conduct his investigations of reality
deductively, analytically. The realist,
contrarily, must conduct his investiga
tions of reality inductively, synthetical
ly. Either method will result in a
satisfactory cognitive structure provided
harmony becomes the test of validity and
provided the deducer starts with the
truth he believes in and the inducer
starts with an experience or experiment
in the validity of which he has a high
degree of confidence. This constitutes
perspectivism's formal epistemology—
simple, direct, and tailored to the in
dividual's own perspective. Pirandello
expressed it in his play, "Right You Are if
You Think You Are."
If, to return to our analogy, we imag
ine the topmost sphere of the tetra
hedron to be the summum bonum and
the base to be raw experience, we can
readily see that to analyze we would pro
ceed downward and that to synthesize
we would proceed upward. The deduc
tive approach of the idealist would lead
us downward from the summum bonum
toward basal experience, so that we
could begin to interpret our experiences,
so that they would not be so widely
divergent from one to another. From
such organized experience we could in
terpret the experience that writers incor
porate into characters. This interpreta
tion would enable us to test the quality
of character, to see whether the charac
ter is a full-blown lifelike character, con
sistent and logical and feeling, or
whether he is a half-baked grotesque.
The inductive approach of the realist
would lead us upward from basal ex
perience toward the summum bonum.
Each approach would produce an in
tegrated view of reality that would be
stable even if tipped to a new perspec
tive. If, for example, our perspective
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should be formal, as opposed to func
tional or essential, the approach, induc
tive or deductive, would remain con
stant, even if the perspective were tipped
to the functional or tipped to the
perspective of the essence of things. Fur
thermore, we could conceivably shift our
perspective at will without becoming
disoriented.
Using the models of the tetrahedron or
the pyramid to express the relationship
of perspectivism to two other major
philosophical systems of the modern age,
we might view the pragmatic philosophy
as a basement dug under the base line of
raw experience, into which the pyramid
will tumble when the digging is carried
to its logical extremes. We might view
the existentialist philosophy as a needlesharp antenna rising from the top of a
pyramid into nothingness or nihilism,
from which the only logical course of ac
tion is suicide, as Ernest Hemingway
concluded several years ago. John Dew
ey, at the opposite extreme, turned his
analytical method on base experience.
Starting with Berkeley's sensory data,
Dewey began to deduce the elements in
that experience that he believed were
essential to education and ultimately
knowledge. He was deducing, starting at
the base of the pyramid. He found the
system of thought not very stable. In
fact, he decided the only constant was
change, an illogical posture in which to
find oneself, seeing that that constant
would also be subject to change.
Paul Tillich and Jean Paul Sartre, on
the other extreme, started with the con
cept of a summum bonum and began to
employ the inductive process to in
vestigate upward from the top of the
pyramid, only to find themselves rising
to a level of meaninglessness. Paul
Tillich, however, unlike Sartre, decided
that the meaning must therefore reside
in God, in whom we exist and of whom
we consist; thus, he returned to the top
of the tetrahedron to the summum
bonum. Much of modern theology seems
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to spin off the needle-sharp pinnacle of
the existentialist antenna atop the pyra
mid, as much of modern science seems to
employ analysis below the level of
human experience and thus seems to
undermine the foundations on which the
pyramid rests.
Ethically, perspectivism tests every act
or decision by the simple test of balance
or harmony. If an act does not produce
disharmony either within the individual
or between the individual and other in
dividuals, it is deemed good. This test
may be applied with equal force to
larger segments of society or political
units, or, I submit to you, to literary
studies. Often it results in the simple ex
pedient of a refraining for love. The
same test may be applied to a work of
art, to a piece of literature, to determine
aesthetic values. If there is harmony, in
form, in function, and in essence, there
is beauty. As John Keats said in his im
mortal "Ode on a Grecian Urn," "Beauty
is truth, truth beauty—that is all / Ye
know on earth, and all ye need to
know."
In summary, perspectivism affords a
fresh perspective on what is real and sug
gests something of the subjective nature
of verifiable reality. In attempting to
harmonize seemingly irreconcilable dif
ferences, the new philosophy conforms
to the function of the two semicircular
canals in the inner ear that serve as our
sixth sense, the kinesthetic-kinetic sense,
the sense of balance and sense of motion
or harmony. The new philosophy re
moves the individual ego from an
"I/thou" relationship to a "we" relation
ship, in which we all share individual
differences without one person's being
superior to another. In such a spirit of
togetherness and cooperation, even ge
nial criticism, perhaps true harmony can
be realized or idealized in the world of
tomorrow.
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